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The Biodiversity Bill has been drafted in response to the Biodiversity Convention 
(CBD). However, the CBD is not as specific and demanding as TRIPS and 
substantial scope is left to states to adopt laws that fit their needs and priorities. The 
bill reflects, for instance, the government’s strong reaction to biopiracy or the illegal 
appropriation of resources or knowledge. The bill is also partly informed by the 
desire to avoid a direct confrontation with WTO obligations in this field.  
 
Focus on access and sovereignty 
 
Generally, the bill does not provide a comprehensive framework for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological resources. In fact, it focuses mainly on the question 
of access to resources. Its response to the current challenges is to assert the 
country’s sovereign rights over natural resources. It therefore proposes to put 
stringent limits on access to biological resources or related knowledge for all 
foreigners. While the idea is to stop access by western country nationals and 
companies and reduce biopiracy, it is surprising to see that all foreigners are treated 
alike. In fact, there are a number of small and least developed countries which might 
greatly benefit from facilitated access to India’s vast biological resources to foster the 
fulfilment of basic food and health needs. Restricting access to these countries and 
reducing the flows of material to international research centres may serve some 
short-term interests but seems to go, for instance, against the professed solidarity 
among developing countries.  
 
Generally, the bill’s insistence on sovereign rights reflects current attempts by all 
actors around the world to assert property rights over the resources or knowledge 
they control. In principle, an isolationist path may constitute a viable alternative for a 
vast country but the question of access must be seen in a broader context.  Over the 
past couple of decades, a network of international centres (CGIAR) have been set 
up to foster the exchange and availability of resources for all countries. India has, 
like many other countries, substantially benefited from the principle of freely sharing 
knowledge and resources. Indeed, the CGIAR centres provided some of the Green 
Revolution varieties that had significant impacts on overall food production. The 
system proposed by the bill is likely to result in fewer flows of resources to CGIAR 
centres from India, and other countries are likely to adopt a similar attitude in 
reaction. It is doubtful whether this constitutes an appropriate strategy in a situation 
where the CGIAR collections over which India has no independent control account 
for about 40% of the worldwide accessions for food crops. Further, nearly all 
countries are dependent from moderate to very high degrees on genetic resources 
from other regions for their main staples. It is therefore unlikely that closing the 
avenues for sharing resources and knowledge will contribute to solving the 
widespread problem of malnutrition. 
 
Access within India 
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While the bill focuses on preserving India’s interests vis-à-vis other states in rather 
strong terms, its main impact within the country will be to concentrate power in the 
hands of the government. Indeed, Indian citizens and legal persons must give prior 
intimation of their intention to obtain biological resources to the state biodiversity 
boards. The bill is even more stringent in terms of intellectual property rights since it 
requires that all inventors obtain the consent of the National Biodiversity Authority 
before applying for such rights. The impacts of this clause are, however, likely to be 
limited since patent applications are covered by a separate clause. Further, the 
Authority has no extra-territorial authority and cannot monitor applications for 




The bill addresses the question of the rights of holders of local knowledge by setting 
up a system of benefit-sharing. The proposed scheme is innovative insofar as it 
provides that the Authority can grant joint ownership of a monopoly intellectual right 
to the inventor and the Authority or to the actual contributors if they can be identified. 
However, sharing property rights sharing is only one of the avenues that the 
Authority can choose to discharge of its obligation to determine benefit-sharing. 
Further, it is in the Authority’s power to allocate rights to itself or a contributor such 
as a farmer contributor and the latter has no right to demand the allocation of 
property rights. Other forms of benefit-sharing include technology transfers, 
association of benefit claimers with research and development or the location of 
production, research and development units in areas where this will facilitate better 
living standards to the benefit claimers. The focus on non-financial benefits is 
notable because these tend to be more long lasting than monetary compensation.  
 
Concerns relating to property rights 
 
The bill generally focuses on the rights of the state (sovereign rights) and monopoly 
intellectual property rights such as patents. The implication is that most property 
rights will be in the hands of the state and private companies. This has the 
unfortunate consequence that the bill does not provide a framework for the rights of 
other holders of biological resources and related knowledge. The proposed system 
thus implies that resources and knowledge which are not allocated to private entities 
through intellectual property rights are deemed to be freely available. Further, the bill 
does not give current rights holders, such as individual farmers or local communities, 
the capacity to defend their rights in the same way that it seeks to equip the state to 
fight biopiracy. 
 
This problem is reflected in several ways. First, where benefit-sharing is allocated in 
the form of money, the Authority has the power to determine whether the money 
should be paid directly to benefit-claimers or used generally for biodiversity 
management activities. Thus, even identified benefit-claimers do not have a right to 
the money that is paid by the entity using their resources or knowledge. Similarly, 
where the Authority chooses to grant property rights to local innovators, they do not 
have a right to the allocation but are dependent on the Authority’s goodwill. This can 
be compared with the situation of applicants for patent rights who need the 
Authority’s approval but cannot be stopped from applying for the right. Third, the bill 
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is conspicuously shy in its treatment of traditional and local knowledge. It only 
requires the Central Government to ‘endeavour to respect and protect’ such 
knowledge. It is unfortunate that the bill does not deal with this aspect directly since it 
otherwise seeks to provide a comprehensive framework for property rights. Further, 
the formulation employed implies that the government does not intend to provide 
individual or common property rights for these types of knowledge. 
 
On the whole, the biodiversity bill provides a property rights framework which seeks 
to be very firm on the question of access from outsiders even though the practical 
impacts of this stand will be limited because it cannot apply to resources already 
outside of the country. The bill accepts the introduction of intellectual property rights 
over biodiversity provided for in the TRIPS Agreement but does not directly seek to 
make sure intellectual property rights are subordinated to the goals of the 
Biodiversity Convention as provided for in the convention. One of the striking 
features of the proposed regime is that it completely obliterates common property 
arrangements whose importance and extent in the context of the management of 
biological resources is still immense. 
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